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On January 31, 2005, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) published the Animal Feeding
Operation Consent Agreement and Final
Order (AFO CAFO)1 in the Federal
Register.2 The AFO CAFO establishes an
agreement between the EPA and Animal
Feeding Operations (AFOs).  The AFOs
that sign the consent agreement are obli-
gated to provide funding for a nationwide
emissions monitoring study and to coop-
erate with the EPA in formulating a new
regulatory regime for the livestock indus-
try.3 In return, EPA enters a covenant not
to sue and provides a limited release from
liability for certain past and ongoing
Clean Air Act (CAA), Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), and
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) violations.4
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1.  In this note, the Animal Feeding Operation
Consent Agreement and Final Order will be
referred to by the acronym “AFO CAFO.”  The name
of the proposed order has caused some confusion
because the acronym “CAFO” is industry terminol-
ogy for “Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation.”
2. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 4958
(proposed Jan. 31, 2005).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4962.
On its face, the AFO CAFO appears to
encourage and facilitate cooperation
between the EPA and the livestock indus-
try.  However, a closer look reveals a
“sweetheart deal that turned its back on
the scientific and environmental commu-
nities.”5 The “sweetheart deal” removes
liability from AFOs in exchange for infor-
mation and cooperation that the livestock
industry is already obligated to provide to
the EPA.6
This note explains the AFO CAFO and
the details of the Consent Agreement
between the EPA and the livestock indus-
try.  It also discusses the procedural and
substantive concerns surrounding the cre-
ation of the AFO CAFO regulation
scheme.  This note concludes with a dis-
cussion on how the AFO CAFO’s use of
EPA’s enforcement power creates a dan-
gerous precedent that will affect the inter-
action between agencies, states, and con-
cerned citizens and greatly impede efforts
to enforce existing environmental regula-
tions. 
II. The Livestock Industry
A. Overview of the Livestock Industry
and Animal Feeding Operations
The United States’ varied livestock
industry ranges from meat production to
animal products, such as dairy goods.
Throughout the history of the United
States, the livestock industry has been,
and continues to be, politically powerful
and economically important, accounting
for a large portion of the U.S. economy.7
According to recent United States
Department of Agriculture estimates, the
livestock industry is expected to yield a
gross domestic product greater than
eleven trillion dollars in the year 2006.8
In contrast to its impressive econom-
ic projections, the number of producers in
the livestock industry is not expanding.
Rather, the industry is moving away from
its origins as a conglomerate of many
small family-run farms and is rapidly
becoming an industry of a few elite and
powerful manufacturers.9 Between 1987
and 1992, the “total number of animal
units produced in the U.S. increased by
about 4.5 million (approximately 3 per-
cent) . . . however, the number of AFOs
decreased, indicating a consolidation
within the industry overall and greater
production from fewer, larger AFOs.”10
Industrialized animal factories are
known as animal feeding operations or
concentrated animal feeding operations
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5. Michael Janofsky, E.P.A. Offers an Amnesty if
Big Farms are Monitored, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2005, at
A8 (quoting Joe Rudek, a senior scientist with
Environmental Defense).
6. Id.
7. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC
RESEARCH SERVICE, LIVESTOCK, DAIRY, AND POULTRY
OUTLOOK, ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE LIVESTOCK
SECTOR (figures from Philadelphia Federal Reserve
Bank, Survey of Professional Forecasters (Feb. 2006)),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
ldp/LDPTables.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
8. Id. (Eleven trillion dollar figure is a chain-
weighted Gross Domestic Product estimation
using the valuation of the year 2000 U.S. dollar.)
9. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED REVISIONS
TO THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION
SYSTEM REGULATION AND THE EFFLUENT GUIDELINES FOR
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, EPA-821-
B-01-001, 1-3 (2001), available at
http://epa.gov/ost/guide/cafo/pdf/EnvAssessPt1of2
.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT].
10. Id.
a lot or facility (other than an
aquatic animal production facility)
where the following conditions are
met:
(i) Animals (other than aquatic
animals) have been, are, or will
be stabled or confined and fed
or maintained for a total of 45
days or more in any 12-month
period, and 
(ii) Crops, vegetation, forage
growth, or post-harvest residues
are not sustained in the normal
growing season over any portion
of the lot or facility.11
The consolidation of a large number
of animals in controlled, industrialized
environments has created an animal man-
ufacturing business with all the environ-
mental risks and downsides typically
associated with traditional manufactur-
ing.12
B. AFO Pollutants and Environmental
Concerns
Due to the large numbers of livestock
onsite, AFOs are environmental hazards
to the communities located around them.
The primary concerns are the environmen-
tal impacts associated with the large con-
centration of untreated animal waste
found at AFO sites.13 In 1997, the United
States Department of Agriculture’s
National Resources Conservation Service
“estimated that 291 billion pounds of
manure measured on a wet basis was
generated . . . from swine, poultry, and
beef and dairy cattle.”14 In comparison, in
1997, “the human sanitary waste produc-
tion . . . was only 49 billion pounds.”15
While large amounts of untreated
animal waste have environmental impacts
that affect the quality of water and land
around an AFO,16 the AFO CAFO was writ-
ten primarily to address the air pollution
problems associated with AFOs.17 As
such, this note focuses on the hazards
that AFOs pose to air quality and the
implications of the air pollution problem
on the public health of communities that
neighbor AFOs.
1. Air Pollutants
AFOs emit many potentially haz-
ardous air pollutants that are byproducts
of the high animal concentration on AFOs
and their associated manure storage and
land application sites.18 Among the air
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11. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2006).
12. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at
1-1.
13. Id. at 2-1.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2-2.  In addition to the differences in
the amount of waste, animal waste product from
AFOs and human waste that goes through sanitary
systems are treated in vastly different ways.  The
management, treatment, and disposal systems
associated with human waste are highly regulated.
In contrast, the disposal of animal waste is largely
unregulated.
16.  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Managing Manure Nutrients at Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations, EPA-821-B-04-009, at
2-1 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/
pubs/cafo_manure_guidance.pdf (last visited Apr.
11, 2006).
17. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4962.
18. IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY & THE UNIVERSITY OF
IOWA STUDY GROUP, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCES
RESEARCH CENTER, IOWA CONCENTRATED ANIMAL
FEEDING OPERATION AIR QUALITY STUDY 5-6 (2002)
[hereinafter IOWA STUDY], available at
http://www.public-health.uiowa.edu/ehsrc/
CAFOstudy.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
ammonia (NH3), nitric oxide (NO), hydro-
gen sulfide (H2S), nitrous oxide (N2O),
and methane (CH4); the general class of
materials designated volatile organic
compounds (VOCs); odor-causing com-
pounds; and the aerosol classes PM2.5
and PM10 (particulate matter).”19
Ammonia, nitric oxide, hydrogen sul-
fide, nitrous oxide, and VOCs primarily
result from the decomposition of livestock
excrement.20 The severity of each emis-
sion varies from AFO to AFO depending
on the number of animals present and the
type of waste storage and disposal the
facility uses.21 Methane and other odor-
causing compounds are byproducts of not
only the breakdown of manure, but also of
animal digestion.22 These emissions also
vary between facilities, with AFOs that
contain ruminant animals contributing to
the lion’s share of the problem.23 An
“adult cow produces between 80 and 120
kg of [methane] annually,” and in 1999, it
was estimated that “[n]inety-five percent
of [methane] emissions from agricultural
activities came from livestock produc-
tion.”24 Lastly, and of great concern, are
the particulate matter emissions from
AFOs.  Sources of particulate matter from
AFOs vary and can range from very small
particulates, such as epithelial cells and
other bioaerosols,25 to larger particulates,
such as feathers, hair, and particles from
feed or dried manure.26
2. Public Health Concerns
Due to the hazardous nature of these
air pollutants, AFOs have been scrutinized
by many scientific and public health
organizations, such as the EPA, the
National Academy of Sciences, the
American Lung Association, and various
universities.27 Many studies have shown
that the regulated AFO emissions have
health effects that “include respiratory
diseases (asthma, hypersensitivity pneu-
monitis, industrial bronchitis), cardiovas-
cular events (sudden death associated
with particulate air pollution), and neu-
ropsychiatric conditions (due to odor as
well as delayed effects of toxic inhala-
tions).”28
Studies have shown both short-term
and long-term exposure to air pollutants
result in serious short-term and long-term
public health effects.29 Short-term acute
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19. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE
SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR ESTIMATING AIR EMISSIONS FROM
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS: INTERIM REPORT 14-20
(2002) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10391.html (last visit-
ed Apr. 11, 2006).  See also, IOWA STUDY, supra note
18, at 42.
20. NAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 14-20.
21. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at
2-7 – 2-16.
22. NAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Bioaerosols are “particles of biological ori-
gin that are suspended in air.  These include bac-
teria, fungi, fungal and bacterial spores, viruses,
mammalian cell debris, products of microorgan-
isms, pollens, and aeroallergens.”  IOWA STUDY,
supra note 18, at 36.
26. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at
2-16.
27. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT,
supra note 9; IOWA STUDY, supra note 18, NAS REPORT,
supra note 19; AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, State of the
Air 2004 (2004), available at
http://lungaction.org/reports/sota04_full.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2006); AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION,
State of the Air 2005 (2005), available at http://lungac-
tion.org/
reports/sota05_full.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006)
[hereinafter SOTA 05].
28. IOWA STUDY, supra note 18, at 122.
29. SOTA 05, supra note 27, at 56.
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effects such as coughing, wheezing, car-
diac arrhythmias and heart attacks.30
Long-term exposure, even at low levels,
can lead to chronic health effects such as
premature births, increased risk of cardio-
vascular disease, asthma, and other seri-
ous respiratory problems.31
As the livestock industry moves to
fewer, more geographically concentrated
facilities housing a greater number of ani-
mals, AFOs will pose serious health risks
to the public at large, with the greatest
concentration of adverse impacts on
neighboring communities.32 Given the
hazardous nature of these air pollutants,
the government has created several ways
to regulate the livestock industry through
federal statutes.  If released in sufficient
quantities, ammonia and hydrogen sul-
fide are regulated by CERCLA and EPCRA.
Hydrogen sulfide, PM, and VOCs are regu-
lated under the CAA.  Other pollutants are
regulated under specific state rules and
environmental statutes.33 However,
despite the federal and state protections
in place, rules such as the AFO CAFO
threaten to remove government enforce-
ment and increase the threat AFOs pose
to public health.
III. Animal Feeding Operation Consent
Agreement and Final Order
A. Overview of the Air Compliance
Agreement
The Animal Feeding Operation
Consent Agreement and Final Order is an
attempt for the EPA to gain industry
cooperation in order to obtain informa-
tion regarding AFO air emissions and to
ensure compliance with existing CAA reg-
ulations.34 In exchange for the coopera-
tion of the livestock industry, EPA offers a
“limited release and covenant not to sue
for certain past and on-going CAA, CER-
CLA, and EPCRA violations.”35
B. Applicability of the AFO CAFO
The Air Compliance Agreement
(“Agreement”) established in the AFO
CAFO is offered to “AFOs in the egg, broil-
er chicken,36 turkey, dairy and swine
industries.”37 The Agreement is also
extended to contract growers and integra-
tors,38 primarily found in the swine, broil-
er chicken, and turkey industry.  Despite
the broad application, the Agreement
does not apply to all AFOs.  The
Agreement’s focus on emissions from AFO















32. IOWA STUDY, supra note 18, at 122.
33. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4959.
34. Id. at 4958.
35. Id. at 4959.
36. “A tender young chicken suitable for broiling”
is less than thirteen weeks old at time of slaughter.
OKLAHOMA 4-H PROGRAMS, OKLAHOMA AG IN THE
CLASSROOM GLOSSARY (2006), available at
http://www.clover.okstate.edu/fourh/aitc/lessons/gl
ossary/bisfor.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE, BACKGROUND STATISTICS ON THE U.S. BROILER
INDUSTRY (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.ers.usda.gov/
News/broilerCoverage.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2006).
37. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4959.
38. Contract growers are AFOs that grow the
animals, often times on behalf of multiple compa-
nies that usually own the animals and provide feed
and medical services.  After maturing the animals,
contract growers deliver the animals to AFOs
known as integrators.  Integrators process and
market the meat products.  Animal Feeding
Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order,
70 Fed. Reg. at 4960.
Mariel Kusano Volume 12, Number 2
cultural livestock, and from lagoons or
similar structures that are used for stor-
age and/or treatment of agricultural live-
stock waste” require it to exclude AFOs
that implement open-air feedlots exclu-
sively, such as cattle feedlots.39
C. Major Terms of the Air Compliance
Agreement
1. Civil Penalty with No Admission of
Liability
All AFOs that sign the Air
Compliance Agreement agree to pay a
civil penalty based on the size of the AFO,
with the penalty range affected by the ani-
mal species and the number of each
species housed at the AFO.40 Although
the civil penalty considers the type and
quantity of animals, the “total penalty is
capped and ranges from $10,000 for a par-
ticipant having 10 or fewer farms to
$100,000 for a participant having over 200
farms.”41
A civil penalty is typically a “fine
assessed for a violation of a statute or reg-
ulation.”42 Despite the common usage
definition, the agreement to pay a civil
penalty when signing on to the AFO CAFO
does not equate to an admission of guilt,
nor is it an admission of liability for vio-
lating federal statutes.43 As written, the
AFO CAFO requires the payment of a civil
penalty as a mere condition to signing the
agreement.44 It does not identify the spe-
cific violation, if any, for which the AFO is
being penalized.45
2. Funding and Cooperation - Emissions
Monitoring Study
In addition to the payment of a civil
penalty, all participating AFOs must con-
tribute a “payment of approximately
$2,500 per farm into a fund to conduct a
nationwide emission monitoring study
and for making their facilities available for
emissions testing.”46 According to the
AFO CAFO, the purpose of the two-year
monitoring study is to:
collect data and aggregate
it with appropriate existing
emissions data; analyze the
monitoring results; and create
tools (e.g. tables and/or emis-
sion models) that AFOs could
use to determine whether they
emit pollutants at levels that
require them to apply for per-
mits under the CAA or submit
notifications under CERCLA or
EPCRA . . . to generate scientifi-
cally credible data to provide for
the characterization of emis-
sions from all major types of
AFOs in all geographic areas
where they are located.47
At the conclusion of the monitoring
period, EPA will use the data “to develop
emissions estimating methodologies
[that] . . . will then be used by the AFO
industry to estimate their annual emis-
sions.”48 After the creation of the new
emissions estimating methodologies, all













39. Id. at 4959.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004).
43. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4959.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 4958.
46. Id. at 4959.
47. Id. at 4960.
48. Id. at 4959.
49. Id.













will be required to “determine their emis-
sions and to comply with all applicable
CAA requirements, including applying for
all required permits, and to make any req-
uisite hazardous release notices under
CERCLA and EPCRA.”49
3. EPA’s Limited Release and Covenant
Not to Sue
In exchange for the payment of civil
penalties, contributions to the emissions
study, and cooperation with EPA in moni-
toring emissions, the AFOs receive a
release and a limited, conditional
covenant not to file civil suits for certain
violations.50 This release and covenant
not to sue covers an “AFO’s liability for
failing to comply with certain provisions
of CERCLA, EPCRA, and the CAA up to the
time the AFO reports its releases under
CERCLA or EPCRA and applies for and
receives the requisite CAA permits.”51
The EPA can revoke the limited
release and consent not to sue given cer-
tain conditions.52 While any failure to
comply with the agreement can result in
the revocation of immunity, revocation
can also occur if the participating AFOs
fail to comply with “all final actions and
final orders issued by the State or local
authority that address a nuisance arising
from air emissions at the AFO.”53
Regardless of the civil penalties paid or
contributions given to the emissions
monitoring study, any participating AFO
that has its limited release and consent
not to sue revoked could be held liable for
all past and ongoing violations.54
More troubling than the AFOs’ immu-
nity from EPA prosecution for past and
ongoing violations of the CAA, CERCLA,
and EPCRA,55 is the implied immunity
from prosecution from State and citizen
suits.  After outlining the AFO’s immunity
from EPA suits, the AFO CAFO states that
“the [Air Compliance] Agreement will not
affect the ability of States or citizens to
enforce compliance with nonfederally
enforceable State laws, existing or future,
that are applicable to AFOs.”56 By differ-
entiating between nonfederal and federal
laws, this statement implies that the
Agreement will affect the ability of States
or citizens to enforce compliance with
existing and future federal laws that are
applicable to AFOs, e.g., CERCLA, EPCRA,
or CAA.57 If read in this light, the AFO
CAFO impinges on the states’ or con-
cerned citizens’ ability to bring suit
against AFOs for violations of federal law.
D. EPA’s Justification of the Covenant
Not to Sue
To justify the Agreement and the
covenant not to sue, EPA argues that the
AFO CAFO will stimulate cooperation
between the EPA, the scientific communi-
ty, and the livestock industry.58 Further,
EPA claims that the collaboration of gov-
ernment and industry through an emis-
sions monitoring study will result in a bet-






55. Id. at 4958.
56. Id. at 4959 (emphases added).
57. There is some question whether CAA, CER-
CLA, and EPCRA allow the EPA to create a regula-
tory regime that precludes state and citizen suits.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §
9603 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (2006).
58. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4958.
59. Id.













more effective and efficient regulatory
regime.59
1. Efficiency
One of EPA’s justifications for the
implementation of the AFO CAFO is that
the Agreement will be the “quickest and
most effective way to address the current
uncertainty regarding emissions from
AFOs and to bring all participating AFOs
into compliance with all applicable regu-
latory requirements.”60 Although the EPA
has the power to monitor AFOs and create
individual consent agreements that force
compliance with federal law, the EPA
argues that the case-by-case “process has
[proven] to be difficult and time consum-
ing, partly due to the uncertainty regard-
ing emissions from AFOs.”61 In addition
to the time factor, EPA also emphasizes
that case-by-case enforcement results in
inefficient regulation of the livestock
industry—i.e., one AFO at a time, as
opposed to the broad enforcement possi-
ble through the general application of the
AFO CAFO.62
2. Enforcement power
EPA further justifies its AFO CAFO by
denying that the Agreement will negative-
ly affect EPA’s role in enforcement and
regulation of the livestock industry.63 In
its summary of the Agreement, the EPA
specifically states that “[t]he Air
Compliance Agreement will not affect in
any way EPA’s ability to respond to an
imminent and substantial endangerment
to public health, welfare or the environ-
ment.”64 While arguing that the agency’s
enforcement power will not be reduced by
the Agreement in the AFO CAFO, the EPA
de-emphasizes its enforcement role and
states that “many of the negative impacts
resulting from AFOs . . . are not currently
regulated under Federal laws, but are
addressed by State and local laws.”65 The
AFO CAFO describes EPA as only having a
“limited role in dealing with many of the
potential impacts from AFOs.”66 While
appearing to highlight EPA’s commitment
to enforcement, the language used to jus-
tify the consent not to sue minimizes
EPA’s congressionally mandated enforce-
ment obligations under statutes such as
the CAA.
IV. A New Use of Enforcement Power –
The Flaws in EPA’s AFO CAFO
A. Procedural Concerns - Administrative
Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) sets out general requirements that
the EPA must follow for rulemaking.67
According to 5 U.S.C. section 551, rule-
making is an “agency process for formu-
lating, amending, or repealing a rule,”68
which is the
whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particu-
lar applicability and future effect
designed to implement, inter-
pret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, pro-
cedure, or practice requirements
of an agency and includes the
approval or prescription for the






65. Id. at 4959.
66. Id.
67. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).













or financial structures or reor-
ganizations thereof, prices, facil-
ities, appliances, services or
allowances therefor or of valua-
tions, costs, or accounting, or
practices bearing on any of the
foregoing.69
The AFO CAFO is an agreement of
general applicability that is open to all quali-
fying AFOs.70 The primary goal of the
agreement is to create an emissions mon-
itoring study that would have a “future
effect designed to implement, interpret,
or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency.”71 A prospec-
tive, future-oriented goal that has general
application typically falls under rulemak-
ing as defined by the Administrative
Procedure Act.72
The procedural requirements of the
APA apply because “‘the agency action
jeopardizes the rights and interests of par-
ties.”73 If an agency action jeopardizes
the rights and interests of parties, the
action “must be subject to public com-
ment prior to taking effect.”74 The AFO
CAFO’s limited release and consent not to
sue may preclude state and citizen suits
against participating AFOs, therefore
greatly impinging citizens’ right to enforce
federal statutes, such as the CAA.  Further,
the AFO CAFO affects the rights and inter-
ests of the AFOs.  The AFOs that voluntar-
ily sign on to the Agreement not only
agree to pay a fine dependent on the size
of its operation, but also consent to par-
ticipate in the emissions monitoring pro-
gram outlined in the AFO CAFO.75 The
AFOs that do not qualify or choose not to
participate are also affected because they
are subject to potential enforcement
action and are excluded from an emission
monitoring study that has the potential to
affect future regulation.76 Due to the
rights and interests affected by the AFO
CAFO, the AFO CAFO could be considered
an agency action that impinges on the
rights and interests of parties thus trigger-
ing APA procedural requirements. 
1. Insincerity of Comment Request
The APA requires that “general notice
of proposed rule making shall be pub-
lished in the Federal Register.”77 In addi-
tion to publication in the Federal Register,
the APA requires the EPA to publish or
serve a substantive rule no less than 30
days before its effective date.78 The AFO
CAFO was published in the Federal
Register ninety days prior to the end of
the sign-up period—the period of time
when qualifying AFOs could voluntarily
sign the Agreement, which would commit
the AFO to the payment of a fine and par-
ticipation in an emissions study in
exchange for a limited release and
covenant not to sue.79 Although the AFO
CAFO appears to satisfy the time require-
ments for proper notice and comment,
the timing of the public comment period
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6) (2006).
73. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch,
713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Batterton
v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
74. Batterton, 648 F.2d at 708.
75. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4959.
76. Id.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2006).
79. Animal Feeding Operations Consent
Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4959.
80. Id. at 4961-62.













and the industry sign-up period raises
questions on the adequacy of EPA’s publi-
cation of the AFO CAFO.
The timing of the comment period
and the sign-up period throws into ques-
tion the sincerity of EPA’s request and
concern for public comment.  The AFO
CAFO’s comment and sign-up periods ran
concurrently.80 This timing allowed AFOs
to sign on to the Agreement as published
before EPA had the chance to review any
comments.  This implies that any com-
ments received would not significantly
alter the final agreement.  Unsurprisingly,
after the comment period closed, EPA
announced that after reviewing over 650
comments from industry, states, environ-
mental groups, and local citizen groups, it
determined that no change was needed in
the AFO CAFO.81
B. Substantive Concerns – Misuse of
EPA’s Power
1. Delegation of an EPA Investigation to
an Industry Cooperative: Allowing the
Fox to Guard the Henhouse
In addition to the procedural con-
cerns surrounding the AFO CAFO, the
organizational structure of the AFO
CAFO’s emissions monitoring program
illustrates EPA’s failure to participate
actively in the enforcement and regulation
of participating AFOs.  After the initial
agreement between EPA and the partici-
pating AFOs, the Agreement states that
the “participating AFOs will set up an
umbrella nonprofit entity . . . to handle
the funds contributed by the individual
participating facilities.”82 The industry-
established nonprofit would then, without
the collaboration of EPA, “subcontract to
a Science Advisor and independent moni-
toring contractor to run the nationwide
monitoring study.”83 The industry-select-
ed Science Advisor and independent
monitoring contractor are responsible for
creating a plan for the monitoring study
and compiling a list of recommended can-
didate facilities to be monitored.84
Although the plans and list of candidate
facilities must be approved by EPA, the
plan and sample group remain wholly
industry selected.85
Operating pursuant to industry-cre-
ated plans, the industry-selected AFOs
would be studied by the industry-hired
independent monitoring contractor who
would oversee all monitoring using a fleet
of mobile labs purchased by the industry-
created nonprofit organization.86 The
EPA would only begin to investigate the
situation after data is compiled and deliv-
ered to them by the industry entities
established for the emissions monitoring
study.87
Aside from establishing the organiza-
tional blueprints of the emissions moni-
toring study in the AFO CAFO, EPA con-
tributes very little to the creation, opera-
tion, and maintenance of the emissions
monitoring study.88 The organizational
structure established by the AFO CAFO
81. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
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appears to be a delegation of EPA’s
enforcement power to the very industry
that the EPA is attempting to enforce.  The
livestock industry’s control over all areas
of the emissions study, which is intended
to establish stricter and more reliable
emission standards, raises doubts about
the likelihood that the AFO CAFO process
will result in an accurate scientific study.
This is especially true when negative
results promote the tester’s self-interest.
2. Delay in Actual Enforcement Until
2009
Regardless of accusations that the
AFO CAFO will lead to ineffective moni-
toring due to self-regulation, the AFO
CAFO should be considered an ineffective
enforcement order because actual EPA
enforcement will not commence until at
least 2009.89 The AFO CAFO was pub-
lished in the Federal Register on January
31, 2005, with a sign up period of 90 days
post-publication.90 Due to the large num-
ber of comment letters received after the
publication in the Federal Register, the
sign up period was extended on multiple
occasions.91 Given the initial expectation
of a May 1, 2005, sign-up deadline, the
EPA predicted that “monitoring [would]
begin in 2005 and continue for 2 years,”
which would be the “minimum time need-
ed because emissions from AFOs can vary
greatly over the course of a year and may
vary significantly from year to year.”92
Following the two-year study period, the
EPA estimated that methodologies for
estimating annual emissions from AFOs
would be published on its website on a
rolling basis “within 18 months after the
conclusion of the nationwide emissions
monitoring study.”93 The timeline provid-
ed in the AFO CAFO projects a completion
date to be, at best, in 2009.
Even with a liberal reading, the AFO
CAFO establishes a methodology that
would create immunity from enforcement
suits by the EPA and possibly by states
and concerned citizens for a period of four
to five years.94 The limited release and
consent not to sue means that the EPA is
forgoing the enforcement of various feder-
al environmental statutes for all partici-
pating AFOs across the country for nearly
half a decade.95 The AFO CAFO fails to
establish any standards for enforcement
and allows participating AFOs to violate
federal environmental statutes with no
recourse into the far distant future.
V. Conclusion – Future Implications
It is unclear how drastic an effect the
AFO CAFO will have on the regulation of
the livestock industry.  The initial com-
ment period closed on March 2, 2005,96
reopened on March 28, 2005, and finally
closed on May 2, 2005.97 The sign-up
period was extended twice and closed on
July 29, 2005.98 On August 3, 2005, the
90. Id. at 4958.
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sign-up period was reopened and extend-
ed until August 12, 2005, “[i]n order to
provide more time for operators of animal
feeding facilities to make informed deci-
sions about participation.”99 On August
15, 2005, EPA issued a press release stat-
ing that more than 2,000 AFOs signed
agreements, spanning 37 states and rep-
resenting “the pork, egg layers, meat
birds, and dairy industries.”100 The two-
year monitoring study involving a select
group of participating AFOs is scheduled
to begin in early 2006.101
The immediate consequence of the
AFO CAFO agreement between the EPA
and the over 2,000 participating AFOs is
the prevention of the EPA, states, and
concerned citizens from filing suit against
violating AFOs for the duration of the
emissions monitoring study.  This immu-
nity from suit is potentially an open-
ended invitation to violate, especially
given an organizational structure in which
the regulated industry is responsible for
creating the timeline of monitoring and
data collection.102
Despite the unknown potential
effects of the AFO CAFO, the mere fact
that EPA proposed such a rule may affect
other industries.  Whether or not EPA’s
AFO CAFO succeeds in creating a more
efficient and effective regulatory regime
based on industry and government collab-
oration, the creation of an industry-friend-
ly regulatory regime establishes an incen-
tive for other industries to ignore existing
regulations in order to coerce EPA into
implementing a “sweetheart deal.”  The
AFO CAFO is more than an expedient
method in gathering data on AFO emis-
sions—the AFO CAFO is a bold move
towards eroding citizen and state enforce-
ment powers and sets a dangerous prece-
dent for industry and the EPA.  The EPA
should not be allowed to pass of its regu-
latory functions to the very industries it is
meant to police.  Every effort should be
made to ensure that states and citizens’
right to enforce environmental statutes
are not diminished by unchecked “sweet-
heart deals” between EPA and industries.
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